A. The material identity of A and B is usually expressed in Plato's Greek by saying that A and B are "the same" (OIlOLOV).3 I leave the meaning of "property" in this context vague for the moment. I will try to make it more precise in section II. In fact, we do not find a canonical form for such definitions in the dialogues. At least part of the reason for this is that the focus of the entire enterprise is elsewhere, namely, in showing the reader (and, of course, the interlocutor) that without such A.6yoS" at hand, our ability to recognize instances of the ouuea is in serious doubt as well as our ability to know whether Lloyd P. Gerson putative instances possess certain properties. My central contention, however, is that the ability to provide such a AOyOS' is posterior to the understanding of the material identity of any instance of the ouula and its properties. I aim to show that this interpretation, if true, puts in doubt much of the contemporary views about these AOyOl. What is wrong with these views is that they start from one or another unsupportable assumption about the metaphysical and epistemological basis for these definitions.
These assumptions regard (a) the nature of the AOyOS' itself; (b) the relation of the AOyOS' to the one who gives it or knows it; and (c) the nature of the ouula that is to be defined. I consider briefly each assumption.
As R. E. Allen argued many years ago, the AOyOS' being sought is almost certainly not to be understood is a definition ofF per genus et dif.!erentiam.
4 Such a definition is precluded, first of all, by the simplicity of the definiendum. Perhaps more decisively, an Aristotelian genus, at any rate, is in potency to its species, whereas there is no textual basis for attributing potency to any Form in relation to any other. Allen wants to argue that, nevertheless, there is a kind of generic-specific "hierarchy" within Plato's intelligible world, and that the correct way to give a response to the question "what is F?" is with a "map" of a specific Form within the wider or larger generic Form to which it belongs. According to Allen, Forms are definable by "tracing their relations to the broader Forms which contain them". This seems to involve, at least, "difference, implication, and compatibility".5
There is no doubt some good sense in this approach, though it cannot be completely right. For one thing, implication and compatibility are relations among propositions, and Allen himself would deny that Forms are propositions. For another, a Form's difference from another Form would only seem to be discernible on the basis of its "location" within the map. But then what would a statement of difference add to the knowledge which is supposed to be contained within or expressed within the AOYOS'? Indeed, merely asserting that, say, piety is different from justice could hardly be constitutive of a defmition of piety. Yet to say that piety is different from justice in a certain respect, namely, the respect in which it is different, is implicitly to raise the question of what this "respect" is supposed to be over and above what piety is.
Under (b) is the assumption that knowledge of a Form is identical with the ability to give or express this AOyOS' or at least extensionally equivalent with that ability.6 On the face of it, this simply cannot be correct. For one thing, if A who
